Commodities are often stored when the spot price exceeds the future price in a central market. Wright and Williams conjectured that inventories are held in locations far from the central market on these occasions. In these locations the spot price is lower than the price for forward delivery because transport costs are temporarily high. This hypothesis has not been directly tested, because prices for forward delivery are not normally available at non-central locations. This paper uses an example where these prices exist to test the hypothesis. The evidence, from the late nineteenth century corn markets in Chicago and New York, strongly supports the conjecture.
Introduction
In almost all commodity markets, inventories are sometimes held when the future price is lower than the spot price -that is, when prices are in backwardation. This behaviour is so widespread that "supply of storage" graphs showing the spot-future price spread as a function of the quantity of storage are routinely drawn. These curves have a characteristic form: when storage volumes are low, the future price is typically lower than the spot price, but when storage quantities are high, the future price exceeds the spot price. The standard explanation for this curve, dating back to Kaldor (1939) , Working (1949) , and Brennan (1958) , is that some agents hold inventories when the future price is lower than the spot price because they gain a "convenience yield" from their stocks.
In the last two decades, several authors have questioned the necessity of the "convenience yield" explanation for a supply of storage curve. Wright and Williams (1989) argued that the supply of storage curve might be an artifact of an inappropriate method of aggregating inventory levels. They suggested an aggregate supply of storage curve could be drawn even if there were no convenience yield if the spot-future price-spread in one location were compared to the sum of inventories held at a wide range of locations. In particular, they argued that inventories could be profitably held at locations far from a central market where prices were in backwardation if transport costs varied through time, because intertemporal transport price variation makes it possible for spot-future price spreads to vary over space. Williams and Wright (1997) examined the rail transportation and storage networks used to transport wheat to the Australian port of Freemantle to provide empirical support for this argument. They demonstrated that wheat was stored alongside railroads far from the port even when port prices were in backwardation because it was more profitable to store the grain and wait for off-peak transportation than it was to ship it in the peak transport season. Yet they were unable to show that the future price was higher than the spot price in the areas where inventories were held, because future prices did not exist in these locations.
So far it has proved difficult to test this aspect of the Wright-Williams conjecture, because futures markets for a commodity seldom exist near each other. In general, the noncentral locations where inventories are mainly held do not have futures markets, so spotfuture price spreads cannot be calculated in these locations. This paper circumvents this difficulty by using an historic example where two futures markets existed in close proximity.
The example is the New York and Chicago corn markets in the late nineteenth centurymarkets that were a part of the huge trans-Atlantic grain trade. The data are ideally suited to test their hypothesis because transport costs varied seasonally and both cities had active futures markets with spot-future price spreads that were often different. 
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where is the expected trade at time t+n.
[ D t n E T + These equations state that the price in centre C will equal the price in centre D plus shipping costs when C imports from D; otherwise, the price in centre C will be less than the price in centre D plus shipping costs.
The conditions for profitable storage at time t when there is no convenience yield are :
This pair of equations states that the future price in a centre will equal the spot price plus the costs of storage if inventories are positive; if inventories are zero, the future price will be less than the spot price adjusted for storage costs. Equation 3 has the implication that storage will be zero whenever spot prices are greater than the future price.
These equations can be used to analyse two different relationships between inventories and price spreads. The conditions when the central market has no inventories and when prices are in backwardation even though there are inventories in the distant market can be derived by analysing arbitrage relationships over two periods. The conditions when the central market has inventories even though the spot price is greater than a future price can be derived by analysing arbitrage relationships over three periods. These derivations are presented below.
Two period arbitrage relationships.
In this section, price relationships in the two centres are calculated under the assumptions:
A1: Inventories are held in centre D at time t; and A2: D is expected to export to C at time t+1.
From equation 2 and equation 3 applied to D, and
Let be the centre C price at time t at which it is just profitable for inventories to be held, and let *S P *M P be the centre C price at time t at which it is just profitable to import. At , equation 3 applied to C holds with equality and implies
At *M P , equation 1 holds with equality and implies
There are two different cases. Suppose transport prices in period t are low compared to prices in period t+1, that is
Alternately, suppose transport prices in period t are high compared to prices in period t+1, that is
Case (e) is of particular interest. It says that when transport costs are sufficiently high in period t compared to t+1, it is possible for centre C to neither import nor have inventories even though centre D has positive inventories. This, of course, is the argument made by Wright and Williams. In these circumstances, the following price relationships apply 1. 
and
Note that the first of these conditions is less stringent than the requirement that prices in centre D be in backwardation.
Three period arbitrage relationships.
If the above model is extended to three periods, a further implication of the Wright-Williams conjecture can be derived. In particular, inventories may be profitably held in the central market when prices in that market are in "long-term" backwardation if prices in the central market are expected to first rise and then fall. This can occur if transport prices are expected to be temporarily high for some of the time between the present and the time that they are required for future delivery. To show this, the initial assumptions are modified:
A3: Inventories are held in centre D at times t and t+1; and A4: D is expected to export to C at time t+2.
These assumptions imply the following price relationships:
Let be the centre C price at time t+1 at which it is just profitable for inventories to be held, and let 
Assume that transport prices are higher in period 1 than period 2,
, so that . It is then possible to calculate centre C prices in period t as a function of centre C future prices at t+1. Let the price for future delivery in C at period t+1 be 
and the equation for
Suppose centre C prices are in "long-term" backwardation, that is . This implies
If at the same time and
< < , there will be storage in centre C at time t even though prices are in long-term backwardation, and there will be no storage or imports at C at t+1. For this to occur,
Equations 11 and 12 can be satisfied simultaneously if
which will be true if transport costs in period t+1 are sufficiently high compared to transport costs in period t+2 and ε is sufficiently close to zero. In these conditions it is possible for storage to take place in C at time t even though prices are in long term backwardation.
The New York and Chicago nineteenth century corn markets
This paper uses data from the New York and Chicago corn markets in the late nineteenth century to test the Wright-Williams conjecture. The period has been chosen because both cities had active futures markets in the same grade of corn and thus spot-future price spreads can be calculated at the two locations. The relatively close proximity of these two futures markets is unusual, but provides an ideal setting to examine the hypothesis. 1 The markets co-existed because seasonal transport fluctuations meant that a contract promising delivery in Chicago was not always a good substitute for a contract promising delivery in New York. In this section the major features of these markets including trade-flows, transport costs and storage patterns are described.
3.1
Basic production and shipping patterns by rail to New York, using various lines.
While the Great Lakes shipping route was the primary means of transporting corn from Chicago, it was not available between December and April as the harbours and canals froze.
In contrast, the rail route operated all year round. However, since rail freight rates were significantly more expensive than lake and canal freight rates, most grain sold in Chicago and shipped to New York was shipped via the lakes and canals during the open water season 3 .
From 1881 -1891, when transport prices were relatively stable, the average cost of shipping a bushel of corn from Chicago to New York was 7.7 cents by Lake and canal, 10.3 cents by lake and rail, and 14.6 cents by rail (Chicago Board of Trade, 1892, p. 122).
Freight prices from Chicago to New York had a marked seasonal pattern. In part this reflects the unavailability of the lake-canal route during the winter months, and in part reflects seasonal fluctuation in lake-canal and rail freight prices. Figure 1 shows weekly 2 A bushel of corn weighed 56 pounds.
3 See Coleman (forthcoming) for a detailed analysis of the Chicago-New York freight patterns. The analysis is complicated because the Chicago freight statistics include shipments of grain that were sold in Chicago and shipped east and grain that passed through Chicago but which was never unloaded in the city. He uses regression analysis to demonstrate that the vast majority of grain that was sold in Chicago and shipped to New York was shipped via the Great Lakes during the open water season. Throughout the year, however, there were large through shipments by rail that started in the Great Plains region and passed through Chicago. Thus, even though a casual inspection of the data suggests that Chicago frequently shipped grain by rail to New York, this was not the case.
transport costs by lake and canal, and by rail from 1879 -1891. 4 Figure 2 shows the mean transport price by week calculated for each week in each of the years 1881 -1891 for the lake and canal and all-rail transport modes. On average, lake and canal rates fell from the beginning of the season in May until July before increasing by 0.2 cents per week until the end of the shipping season. There is a similar, but much less marked pattern in the lake and rail rates, while the rail rates essential comprise high (winter) and low seasons. 
Basic storage patterns
Chicago inventories were largely determined by shipping patterns. Inventories increased steadily over the winter as corn was brought to Chicago from the surrounding hinterland and stored until the opening of the Great Lakes shipping season. They declined after the shipping season opened in May, and reached a seasonal low at the end of the open water season in November. New York inventories followed a different seasonal pattern.
4 Initially there was marked seasonality in both rail and lake and canal prices, as railroads competed aggressively with each other for the grain business in the summer season. This price competition is understated in the official price data, as much of the business was transacted at lower, unrecorded prices (See the discussion by Nimmo in his reports on the internal commerce of the United States: United States Bureau of Statistics, 1879, 1881, 1884.) The competition was sufficiently fierce to divert substantial quantities of the grain trade from the water route to rail (Tunell, 1897.) The seasonal pattern in rail prices persisted until the mid 1880s, but declined after the passing of the Interstate Commerce Act 1887, which regulated rail transport and substantially reduced price competition between the lines. 5 I have been unable to assemble a consistent series on freight charges for these through shipments. It appears, however, that they were not noticeably higher in winter than during the open water season. Much larger volumes were shipped during winter than the open water season, however, presumably because grain prices were relatively high in New York in winter as cheap supplies from Chicago were unobtainable.
Receipts were highest from May through July, corresponding to the opening of the Great Lakes shipping route, and again in September and October, corresponding to the first of the new crop. For this reason, inventories reached a peak late in the year, and then declined through winter. Even at peak times, New York had surplus storage capacity, and it was extremely rare for more than 70 percent of the total capacity to be utilised 6 .
Storage charges were subject to regulation. In Chicago maximum storage charges for public warehouses were proscribed by a series of legislative acts and constitutional articles passed by the Illinois State Government, in part because the industry was heavily It is important to note that in both cities the grain elevators served two purposes.
First, the elevators could be used to store grain for long periods. Secondly, they were used to transfer grain from inward bound shipping to outward-bound shipping. When grain arrived in New York, either by rail or by canal boat, it was transferred to an elevator or a lighter and then either stored or shipped. 8 The transfer charge included allowance for a few days storage while the grain was in transit. Since corn was always arriving in New York, the grain held in transit meant that recorded storage quantities were never literally zero even when no grain was held for long term storage 9 .
Storage under Price Backwardation in Chicago and New York
The simultaneous existence of two future markets relatively close to each other means that it is straightforward to directly test the Wright-Williams conjecture. The futurespot spread in New York is calculated at various dates. At each date that prices are in backwardation, the future-spot spread in Chicago is calculated. The Wright-Williams conjecture implies (i) that the future price in Chicago will be greater than the spot price if
Chicago has positive inventories and (ii) the transport cost on that date will be higher than the transport price in the future. Both propositions can be simply tested by calculating the average premiums and testing whether they are significantly greater than zero.
The test is applied to data from the period 1878 -1891 described in Coleman (forthcoming). The data comprise weekly spot and forward prices from Chicago and New
York, weekly storage quantities in both cities, and weekly transport costs. The test is applied to price data from the second week of December, January, February, March, and April and in each case the forward-spot premium is calculated with respect to the May future. The mean future-spot premium in Chicago is calculated on the dates that the future-spot premium in New York is negative.
Chicago and New York inventory and price patterns
Tables 1 -5 present the data for the five months, while table 6 and 7 present the summary statistics for the dates on which prices in New York were in backwardation.
Consider the data for February, in table 3 and also displayed in figure 3. On seven of the thirteen years, the New York May future price was lower than the spot price, by an average of 2.1 cents. On these occasions, Chicago inventories averaged 2.65 million bushels (table 7) and the Chicago May future price was higher than the spot price by 3.7 cents. A test of the hypothesis that the difference between the Chicago May future price and the spot price was equal to zero has a t-statistic of 5.78 and can be rejected at the 1 percent significant level. In addition, on these seven occasions, the February transport cost exceeded May transport cost by an average of 7.7 cents, an amount that is statistically different from zero, with a t-statistic of 8.82. Table 6 shows the results for January and March were similar to those in February. When prices were in backwardation in each of these months, future prices exceeded spot prices in Chicago by an average of approximately 3 cents. In each case, this amount is statistically significant at the one percent significance level. During these months, transport prices exceeded May transport prices by an average of 6 -8 cents, and these differences were also statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This is clear evidence that inventories were held in Chicago when the future price exceeded the spot price and when transport prices were temporarily high.
The results for April are similar, but the average difference between the May future and spot prices was not different from zero at a statistically significant level. In
Chicago the May future prices exceeded the spot prices on 6 out of 7 occasions that New York prices were in backwardation, but the average excess was only 1.4 cents. Presumably the future-spot spread was so small in part because the inventory only needed to be held for a month so only a small carrying charge was warranted.
The results for December are most perplexing. In the second week of December, Chicago prices were in backwardation in three of the seven years that New York prices were in backwardation, that is in 1882, 1884, and 1885. On average, the May future price exceeded the spot price by 1.3 cents, but the hypothesis they were equal cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level. Inventories on the three occasions that Chicago prices were in backwardation were below average, but in each case amounted to more than 600,000 bushels. It is not clear why inventories were held on these occasions, although on all of the occasions the spot price had declined substantially in the previous four weeks and the markets appeared to be unusually unsettled. In two of these years, the spot price had fallen sufficiently by the end of
December that the future price exceeded the spot price by a considerable margin; indeed, price patterns in the fourth week of December were very similar to those in January, February, and March. 10 . Nonetheless, it would appear that just at the end of the open water transport season the Chicago markets were sufficiently unsettled that norm price relationships did not always hold.
Despite the December patterns, the evidence presented is strongly supportive of the Wright-Williams conjecture. For most of the winter season, when transport prices were temporarily high, inventories were held in Chicago at a positive spread even when prices were in backwardation in New York. They were not shipped to New York because the premium that could be earned for immediate delivery was insufficient to pay the additional transport costs; it was more profitable to keep the grain in Chicago and wait for a cheaper shipping time.
New York price patterns
A second test is used to examine the reason why inventories were held in New
York while prices were in backwardation. In section 2 it was shown that it would be profitable to hold inventories in a month like January even if the spot price exceeded the May future price if prices were expected to increase before subsequently falling. This hypothesis has superficial plausibility, for large volumes of corn were shipped to New York at the end of the open water season in anticipation of the high transport costs over the winter. As such, it is quite possible that price for delivery in one month exceeded the price for spot delivery for much of the winter, as inventories were run down, even though the spot price exceeded the price for May delivery. At least one piece of data is consistent with this story: on average, inventories declined in New York each month between January and April.
The hypothesis can be tested by examining the spread between the one-month future price and the spot price on the occasions that spot prices exceeded the May future price in New York, and testing to see whether the average spreads were positive. There is no support for the hypothesis. On six out of seven occasions that prices were in "long-term" backwardation in December, February, and March, and seven out of eight cases in January, the one-month future price was also below the spot price. It follows that in each month the mean price spread was negative, not positive as hypothesised; in three out of the four months one can reject the hypothesis that the one month future price was equal to the spot price at the five percent significance level, in each case because the future price was less than the spot price.
The explanation for why New York had positive inventories while the spot price exceeded both the one month future and the May future must lie elsewhere. As suggested in section 3, it may be because the elevators were dual purpose and the grain in the elevators was being held in transit rather than held for long term storage.
Conclusion
This paper adds to the literature including Benirschka and Binkley (1995), Brennan, Williams, and Wright (1998), and Frechette and Fackler (1999) that has examined the hypothesis that a supply of storage curve may be an artifact of an inappropriate method of aggregating inventory levels. Unlike the other literature, this paper has directly tested whether inventories held in a distant location are held at positive carrying charges when prices in a central market are in backwardation. In the historic episode considered, the answer is an over-whelming "yes": most of the time when corn prices in New York were in backwardation, inventories in Chicago were positive and future prices in Chicago exceeded spot prices. Moreover, the reason why corn was not shipped to New York to take advantage of the temporarily high spot prices is also clear. In accordance with the Wright-Williams conjecture, transport prices were temporarily high in Chicago and it was not worth paying a very high transport price to immediately ship corn to New York to take advantage of the high spot prices in that city.
The paper has been able to conduct a very simple test of the Wright-Williams conjecture because futures markets existed in Chicago and New York. It is unusual to find futures markets for the identical commodity in the same proximity for, as Williams (1986) pointed out, if the prices are highly correlated the market with the highest transactions costs will usually shut down. The fact that these two markets existed so close to each other is not a coincidence, however. The seasonality in the transport costs caused by the closure of the Great Lakes shipping lanes every winter meant that the spot-future price spreads in each city
were not highly correlated with each other, so the New York futures markets could not be used as a substitute for the Chicago markets. In some sense, therefore, it would be surprising if it had not been found that Chicago prices were in contango while those in New York were in backwardation. The circumstances that meant the test could be carried out are the circumstances where one would expect the conjecture to be true.
The second result of the paper was less obvious. An implication of the WrightWilliams conjecture is that if transport costs are variable, inventories can be profitably held in a centre even if the price for forward delivery is below the spot price if prices are expected to increase before declining. In these circumstances inventories are expected to fall to zero sometime before the future contract expires, but they are not run down immediately as speculators realise it will be unusually expensive to import goods in the mean time. Since
New York usually started the winter period with large inventories and ran them down over the winter, it is plausible that this theory could have explained why inventories were held in New York over the winter even though the spot price exceeded the price for May delivery.
The theory does not explain the data, however. Quite simply, almost all the time that spot prices exceeded May prices in New York, spot prices also exceeded the price for delivery in one month's time. An alternative explanation for why inventories were held in New York despite prices being in backwardation is needed.
In this historic episode, transport prices varied because of seasonal weather Spot: spot price in New York or Chicago Stores: inventories in millions of bushels F 1 -S: one month future price minus the spot price F M -S: May future price minus the spot price Spot transport prices for the second week of January (all rail) and the lake and canal price in the first week of May. Spot: spot price in New York or Chicago Stores: inventories in millions of bushels F 1 -S: one month future price minus the spot price F M -S: May future price minus the spot price Spot transport prices for the second week of December (all rail) and the lake and canal price in the first week of May. 
